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This paper analyzes a film as one of the media with the ability to convey certain messages to 
the public. Films can reflect the social and cultural conditions of society, thereby they can be 
used to spread the current ideas, views, and ideologies of a country. Films in Turkey are part 
of a culture that has developed rapidly and has become an entertainment for the people. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reformed and turned Turkey into a new country with the ideology of 
secularism, controlling religious institutions and expressions. This journal article aims to 
describe the implementation of Turkish secular ideology in the country's cultural settings, 
namely censorship of religious elements in Turkish films from 1939 to 1990. The method 
used in this article is critical descriptive through literature study. This article concludes that 
censorship is not only practiced to maintain secularism in Turkey, but also to protect the 
religion itself. 
 




A film is one form of media used for various things such as means of disseminating 
information, propaganda, and entertainment. Initially, Thomas Edison created most of the 
main components of the camera, then the Lumière brothers from France discovered the 
principle of projecting light through a transparent film. The development of the cinema 
industry continues with the increased numbers of frames or pictures per second, making 
images wider, and the addition of colors (Straubhaar, LaRose, & Davenport 2012). These 
advancements not only developed in Western countries, but also in Turkey. Until 2008, the 
number of local films released reached 50 with 60% of the fourth largest market share after 
the United States, India and South Korea (Bell 2010).     
 In 1897, in the heart of the Ottoman Empire that would later become the Turkish 
republic, the earliest known public screening of "photographie vivante" (living photography) 
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took place in Salle Sponeck Istanbul. Before that, in 1896, there had been several private 
screenings of Lumiere films took place at the Ottoman Palace and probably at some other 
aristocratic residences, making it possible for some female viewers to may have seen them as 
well. While some claimed watching films was a sin, others were happy that another element 
of "civilization" had arrived in Istanbul. Such reactions are typical of the ongoing cultural 
debate between Islamic conservatism and westernization and modernization processes 
(Arslan 2011).           
 The development of film in Turkey cannot be separated from the practice of 
secularism in the form of censorship of the religions elements, including censorship of 
Arabic-speaking films. In 1942, the secretary of the RPP warned the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs about the number of Arabic language films noting that Arab films were a threat to the 
Turkish language. This ban, then, was not just a reflection of the wartime conditions, but also 
the importance of Turkish nationalism, which had become increasingly fervent during the 
war as evidenced by ethnic and religious discrimination accompanying the creation of a 
“secular Turkish” country (Arslan 2011). Sensors were then carried out for years at the 
Turkish film festival. In 1980-1981, the Antalya International Film Festival was canceled by 
the committee due to the difference in principle when the military government did not allow 
Turkish films with political content to be screened at the event.   
 This paper aims to analyze the practice of secularism in religious censorship in the 
Turkish cinema. The time span discussed began in 1939, when film censorship began to be 
implemented by the Central Film Control Commission in Ankara based on The Regulations 
on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays, until 1990 when censorship, economic, and 
political practices changed film. Turkish cinema triumphed back to the 1990s when it 




There is some literature relevant to this study. The book edited by Sabine Hake and 
Barbara Mennel entitled Turkish German Cinema in the New Milllenium describes the 
cultural exchange between the Turkish and Germany cinema, related with the migration of 
Turks to Germany in the 1960s (Hake and Menne 2012). In addition, there is a book written 
by Seçil Büker, The Film Does Not End with Ecstatic Kiss, which explains the competition 
between Turkish film companies in modern Turkey such as Soray and Sultana (Büker 2002). 
This article also analyze Dilek Kaya Mutlu‟s chapter entitled “Film Censorship during the 
Golden Era of Turkish Cinema” which focuses on Turkish film censorship during the 1960s 
and the early 1970s, a period not only marked by two military interventions (in 1960 and 
1971), but also considered the golden era of Turkish film production. Thousands of film 
censorship reports were also studied, which reveal the Turkish government views film as a 
powerful discursive domain, even the rival of the government, where various social identities 
and meanings were produced and circulated (Biltereyst 2013).   
 Based on literature and research articles obtained by the authors, this paper 
hypothesize that film cannot be separated from the secularism and modernization project 
developed in the early 20th century in Turkey. Film is a medium used as an instrument to 
project secular values and represent Turkey as a country that progress toward modernity. 
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The method used in this paper is critical descriptive. The steps taken are collecting, 
reviewing, and processing literature materials. In the process, this paper also interpreted data 
from several primary and secondary sources. According to Sugiyono (2012), literature review 
relates to theoretical studies and other references relating to values, culture and norms 
develop in the social situation under study. The steps taken are collecting, analyzing, and 
processing data related to the research topics. The data collected from books, journals, 
articles, and websites is sorted, researched and criticized by re-examining the correctness of 
the data obtained. The interpretation of the data, which has been obtained and linked from 
one event to another event, becomes a systematic sequence of developments and censorship 
progress of Turkish films from 1939 to 1990.      
 The primary sources used in this research are the works of Saves Arslan, Mutlu and 
Koçer, and Brujin, and the secondary sources used are the writings of Zürcher, Behlil, 
Hikmet, Hakke and Mennel, and Buker. 
 
Secularism and Film in Turkey 
 
The role of Islam in the public and political spheres has been a matter of contestation 
throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. After its founding in 1923 under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the state institutionalised the acquisition of Western cultural 
habits and the banishment of Islam from public and political arenas.  The Turkish state‟s 
position on religion translated as „laicism‟, the subordination of religion to the state, then 
secularism, a separation of church and state. In the early Republic period, the state 
established control of religious affairs and institutions (White in Kasaba 2008).   
According to Ahmet T. Kuru, secularism is divided into two: active secularism and 
passive secularism (Kuru 2009). Active secularism is a state effort in prohibiting the use of 
religious symbols in public places, while passive secularism is a state effort in allowing all 
religions to show religious symbols, and impartiality or not only supports the majority 
religion. Based on the description from Kuru, we conclude that in Atatürk's era, Turkey 
embraced active secularism because religious symbols were forbidden to appear in public. 
Whereas at the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey increasingly shifted to passive 
secularism. 
On 23 October 1923 the Republic of Turkey was declared by Mustafa Kemal as the 
president. Mustafa Kemal and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partition) 
launched an extensive reform program by seeing Islam as a sign of 'backward' identity and as 
'reactionary' social forces, and believed to modernize and standardize Turkey, they must 
eliminate the influence of Islam from society (Zürcher 2003). The efforts made to modernize 
and westernize Turkey, as a matter of fact, took place long before the emergence of Mustafa 
Kemal. In the mid-19th century, there were Young Ottomans who wanted to integrate Islam 
and modernization. After Young Ottomans, there was Young Turks, which was more 
political because they wanted to carry out a coup against Sultan Abdulhamid II. Mustafa 
Kemal is a member of the CUP (Commission of Union Progress), a wing organization of 
Young Turks.          
 Mustafa Kemal then implemented a series of reforms to create a homogeneous 
country by subordinating ethnic and religious identities to Turkish nationalism which was 
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determined and controlled by the state. This reform is known as Kemalism and aims to 
control religion and create a secular society. Thus, secularism becomes a "political solution" 
to control and reconstitute Islam according to the needs of the state and the political elite who 
historically control the Turkish state (Yavuz 2009).      
 The practice of secularism was found in Atatürk's reform, namely the abolition of the 
Caliphate, religious courts and traditional religious schools, and the establishment of a secular 
education system in 1924. In 1925, religious-based parties or social groups were dissolved, 
prohibited from using fez and other Islamic headgear and replaced with Western hats. In 
1926, the European calendar was enacted, replacing the Shari'a law with the civil law of the 
Swiss Civil Law and the Italian Criminal Law, the banking sector restructuring law was 
issued, all honorary title such as Bey, Efendi or Pasha were abolished. In 1928, the equality 
of law between women and men was uphold, the articles in the constitution on the 
recognition of Islam as a Turkish state religion was abolished, the use of the Latin alphabet 
was adopted, and in 1932 the Arabic call to prayer was prohibited and replaced in Turkish 
translation. (Zürcher 2003) 
Secularism for Turkey means bringing religion out of politics or freeing politics from 
religious influence, but the state remains involved in religious affairs. Mustafa Kemal's main 
goal is not to abolish religion, but rather to create a set of institutional and legal system to 
“control," "use" and "redefine" Islam (Yavuz 2009). Secularism is used as a tool to control 
the restriction of religion. It can be seen from the reforms in the form of new rules that 
attempt to create a neutral state or separate religion from the state. Because the Republic did 
not approve Islam as a political ideology and as a source of collective identity and solidarity, 
they try to move Islam to the private sphere and minimize its role in the public arena by 
defining religion only as a matter of individual consciousness, belief and worship. This is 
done to create a new identity of Turkey that is independent of Islam, according to Atatürk's 
description of the Turkish revolution, "The nation has united as individuals instead of being 
united by religion and as adherents of sects [religious orders]; now they are held together 
only by the bond of Turkish nationality" (Killi, 2003: 249). 
Although the state rejects religion as a national identity, they are also aware that 
Islam, which has provided the principle of government and daily life in the Ottoman era for 
centuries, cannot be eliminated from social life (Killi 2003). Turkish Islam, which always 
centered on the state, is being used as a national ideology and form of identity in the nation 
building process, and discursively create official versions of Islam (personal Islam, new, 
apolitical and national modifications) that are in accordance with the modern secular view 
and instill modern ideas and ideals of the republic. 
After Atatürk's death in 1938 and a new era with a multiparty system under President 
İnönü began in 1945, many things have changed (Daver 1988). The first Republic of Turkey 
was controlled by one party from 1923 to 1946. The change from a one-party system to a 
multiparty system began with the first competitive election in Turkey held in 1946 between 
the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the new Democrat Party (DP) party. However, the 
first change of government was four years later, after the 1950 general election, when the 
Democrats came to power with an overwhelming majority of votes (Toprak 2005). The main 
issue that became controversial in these two elections was secularism and the role of religion 
in the lives of Turks. The Democratic Party opposed secularism which was supported by the 
Republican party and promised to change the role of religion in Turkey. After the Democratic 
Party came to power, they began to implement some of these changes. Muslims who wish to 
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make a pilgrimage to Mecca were permitted to transfer Turkish currency to foreign exchange; 
call to prayer (azan) in the original Arabic version was allowed; the grave of the saint was 
reopened for a visit; state radio could broadcast prayers during religious holidays; 
government budget for religious affairs was increased; and a number of religious schools and 
a university-level program were opened to train preachers (Toprak 2005). 
 Secularization policy of The Republic of Turkey prioritizes laws that reorganize the 
relationship between religion and the state, but ignore the reforms needed in the relationship 
between religion and society. Cultural and art studies are one of the most important 
instruments needed to achieve this goal, as happened in developed Western countries. The 
Turkish film industry first appeared in the Ottoman Empire in 1896, shortly after the Lumiere 
brothers produced their film, The Arrival of the Train at La Ciotat Station, in 1895 
(Yorulmaz and Blizek 2018). The film first screened in Turkey was shown in the Palace of 
Abdülhamid II. Then, the film began to be watched by the public in 1897, aired at the 
Sponeck Bar or beer shop in Istanbul. Most of the films shown in Turkey are not different 
from other countries, such as silent films, short films, and newsreels. Because the location of 
the screening was at the beer shops, not in theaters, religious Muslims are reluctant to see 
them, thereby limited the number of moviegoers in Turkey (Yorulmaz and Blizek 2018). 
According to Bucker, for years, films in Turkey were "stepbrothers" of pre-existing 
performing arts in the Ottoman era. The first cinema in Istanbul, the Cinema Theater-Pathe 
Feres, opened in 1908. Soon other cinemas also opened in Turkey, e.g. Cine Eclair (1908), 
Cine Oriental (1910), Cine Central (1911), and Cine Magic (1914). The names of the cinemas 
turn into Turkish when the Republic of Turkey was formed. (Bucker 2002).  
 Atatürk considered cinema as one of the way to educate the citizens about 
westernization and modernity. Atatürk encouraged the people to actively participate in the 
film and theater performance, and to develop theater education. This is in stark contrast to 
what was done by the Soviet Union, which made film into a propaganda medium (Brujin 
2012).  The secular view of films relating to religious elements is not very different from the 
views in Hollywood of classical Orientalists toward the Eastern, who were portrayed as 
barbaric, uneducated, and a threat to Western civilization. In the same way, in Turkish films 
priests and most conservative traditions associated with Islam were described as a serious 
obstacle to modernize Turkey into a modern republic.    
 Islamic scholars in the films created at the beginning of the Republic of Turkey were 
often represented as obstacles to the development of society and as unethical traitors who 
used religion for their personal interests (Önal 2014). This depiction made people, especially 
the conservative and religious, upset. One negative response that arises was a reaction during 
the filming process of a movie, The Mystery of Boğazici, which is a film about the use of 
religion for sexual harassment. An attempt was made to prevent the making of the film before 
it even appeared in theaters. Hundreds of people came to destroy the film installed in the 
courtyard of the mosque. In addition, they also attacked the camera, actors, and actresses 
from the film (Önal 2014).         
 The cinema was the cheapest form of public entertainment. The founder of the 
Turkish Republic was not interested in movies as an instrument for spreading Republic 
ethics. Political leaders were only interested in keeping the movie industry under their control 
by enacting a severe censorship system in 1939, and, until the end of World War II, they did 
not support the industry at all. Muhsin Ertuğrul was the only person who produced films in 
the early period of Turkish independence. He believes in Turkey's progress through 
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westernization and secularization. The films produced during this period did not show much 
of the Islamic element  (Heper 2009). 
The film narratives produced in the early period of the Republic of Turkey are based 
on clichés and stereotypes that make a strict distinction between those who are "bad" and 
"good" as representatives of each "conservative religious mentality" and "revolutionary 
perspective" (Önal 2014). The factor of repressed religion in public space resulted in the 
representation of religion in films only at a symbolic level, a characteristic lasted until the 
second half of the 1990s.        
 There are two main motives on the increasing visibility of Islamic director in the 
cinema industry and the gradual rise in the number elements of religion shown in films (Önal 
2014). One motive is the Democratic Party (DP) policy which brings religion more into the 
public sphere. The party's approach to religion involves the incorporation of Islam as a 
cultural tradition into the political mainstream in Turkey. In this view, Religion was 
compared to "social cement" needed for community cohesion for the unity of community. 
Because of Democratic Party politics which legitimized Islam and traditional rural values, 
Islamic groups were gradually drawn to the competitive political arena for the first time. 
 In addition, another motive that underlies the development of religious elements 
supported in films is Islamic directors only considered cinema as a mere tablig, a religious 
mission to tell people about the best aspects of Islam as a religion, for long time. This 
perspective caused them to take a step back in creating the "original cinema language". At 
this point, it is possible to say when Islamic directors produced films that reflect their own 
ideology, they were almost obligated to harmonize the 'restraint of representation' of Islam 
with cinema (Önal 2014). The cinema is also used as an instrument of jihad, so jihad is not 
only done by the sword, but can be done in theaters by films.   
 Religion-genre films also increased in number and became a new commercial genre. 
The films present elements of religion, conveyed in pure mystical fantasies that are far from 
the real world and today, even worse, the films do not consider the accuracy of various 
historical facts. The films tell stories of historical Sufi figures such as Yunus Emre, Haji 
Bektash Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal and Rumi Anadolu, as well as saints and prophets such as 
Joseph, Abraham, Jacob, Job and Solomon, who had a great role in Islamization in the 
Anatolian region. However, the film presented to the majority audience in the Anatolian rural 
area was presented from a commercial pragmatic point of view, without aesthetical attention.
 The creation of religious films began in 1961 with the film The Justice of Omar and 
the number increased. In 1965, there were 6 religious-themed films, and the number 
increased to 28 films in 1973. The films generally combined melodramatic factors, such as 
pain, suffering, melancholy love and improbable coincidence, patience, giving wealth as a 
result from poetic justice, mystical power, and religious factors. Producers use da'wah as a 
tool to accumulate revenues by popularizing religious genres. All these negative 
developments in Turkish films encouraged leftist, secular and conservative groups to come 
together and create high-quality national films.     
 According to directors who see society from a Marxist perspective, religion exists as 
an institution developed by the upper class to control the lower classes in the society. 
However, in Turkish society, religion is the value adopted by the oppressed and persecuted 
class (Önal 2014). Films that reflect priests and other phenomena in Anatolia's social reality 
are recognized in the world cinemas because of their originality and narratives. For example, 
one of the important directors of the period, Yılmaz Güney, was a person who grew up 
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among the poor working class. He developed his own personal style of epic and poetic 
realism and sought to create a new film language that was unique and suitable for Turks. 
 The practice of censorship in Turkey only began in 1932 and was centered and 
supervised by two film control commissions established in Istanbul and Ankara. Supervision 
does not only apply to the finished film but has been enforced since the filming process. In 
1939, The Regulations on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays was implemented. 
According to the regulation, foreign films intended to be screened in Turkey are supervised 
by the Film Control Commission, while local films are supervised by the Central Film 
Control Commission (Mutlu and Koçer 2012).      
 In order for a film to be approved by the Central Film Control Commission and can be 
aired in Turkey, the film must avoid: political propaganda related to a country; demeaning a 
race or ethnicity and offending fellow nations and states; religious propaganda; spreading 
political, economic and social ideologies that are contradictory to the state regime; contrary to 
public decency, morality and national sentiment; demeaning the military; endanger state 
order and security; provoke crime; also includes scenes that could be used as propaganda tool 
against Turkey (Eurimages 2012).       
 Based on these ten criteria, the Central Film Control Commission determines whether 
a film is eligible to appear in Turkey by a majority vote system. The Central Film Control 
Commission can also request a revision of a part of the film. Sometimes, a revision asked 
could be specific, such as how the angle of shooting is; what may or may not be said by a 
character; even how the film's ending should have happened (Mutlu and Koçer 2012). 
 
Film Development and Depiction of Religion in Turkish Film    
  
According to Behlil (2010) film production companies in Turkey were originally 
founded in 1920, but the production was rather limited. In 1948, many companies began to 
enter the market after the issuance of regulations on tax relief for institutionalized local films. 
Behlil  said the film industry in Turkey had established many companies, but out of 17 films, 
only two were still active: Arzu Film and Erler Film. This occurred likely because the 
Turkish film industry has never been a strong oligopoly.     
 During the 1940s, filmmakers were blocked because film was a political artifact 
rather than as a culture. Pre-sensors that take precautions on films before they are produced, 
considered as a potential to omit freedom of creativity. Therefore, during the Second World 
War, the film industry in Turkey was not strong enough artistically, politically or 
technologically (Berktaş 2013)        
 In 1948, the Turkish Film Producer‟s Association managed to obtain a discount in the 
municipality entertainment tax. From 1917 to 1948, the average number of films produced 
per year was two; that number increased to 43 in the 1949-1956 period, 70 in the 1957-1960 
period, 123 in the 1961-1963 period, and 220 in the 1964-1975 period. Filmmakers, however, 
continued to make inexpensive movies for inexpensive public consumption (Heper and Criss 
2009).           
 According to Heper (2009), from the mid-1950s onward, the film magazine Sinema, 
although published for only two years, created for the first time in Turkey an awareness of 
the cinema as art. This had some impact on filmmaking. There were several significant 
factors that had a major influence on the development of Turkish film industry in the 1950s. 
One of them is technology, which provided electricity and supported the establishment of 
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Turkish cinemas in urban and rural areas. This situation also makes films available to 
audiences far wider than before (Yorulmaz and Blizek 2018). The result is that films are 
becoming more popular and creating opportunities for commercials. Turkish film production 
is one of the largest in the world. During this time, Turkish cinema concentrated on the 
production of melodramatic films based on Turkey's highly idealized secular urban society. 
When the urban secular Turkish community produced the films, Islam is not the issue. 
The public moral foundation gets a lot of Islamic influence. In the 1960s, watching movies in 
cinemas became the main agenda for families in Turkey. One reason is because per year, 
200-300 films are shown in Turkish cinemas. The aired films also consist of various genres, 
ranging from comedy to drama, historical films to detective films. In connection with films 
that have become a means of entertainment, in the 1960s secular films have begun to present 
several reports of religious elements in films that are regulated in modern times. For example, 
the commission did not agree to display namaz (ritual prayer), the call to prayer, and show or 
mention the Koran. Scenes that show or involve elements of the religion will be rejected 
because they were exploitation on religious belief and feelings (Mutlu and Koçer 2012). This 
situation is contradictory compared to the Democrat Party (Democratic Party) era, which is 
more inclined to instill liberal and populist values towards religious expression. 
Reports related to censorship in Turkey are not without contradictions. For example, 
the censorship commission rejects religious references in secular Turkish films, but they also 
renounce any scenes depicted the insult and disdain to God. Ratification of the censorship 
commission on this matter, shows although Turkey stands strictly on secularization in social 
life, they also do not promote religion. Instead, they sought to redefine the place of religion in 
modern Turkish society (Mutlu and Koçer 2012). The renewed influence of Islam on public 
life and politics in the 1960s made film production under the theme of Islam profitable. As a 
protest Western-oriented films, educated and left-leaning Islamic producers intend to make 
authentic Turkish films (Bruijn 2012). These developments occur on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Some producers consider Islam to be a characteristic element of Turkish 
culture and therefore make films about the lives of Islamic saints and heroes. The effort was 
called the Milli Cinema (National Cinema) which was later called the Beyaz Cinema (White 
Cinema) (Bruijn 2012). Milli Sinema is a movement that aims to bring religion, especially 
Islam, and the source of culture into the cinema as a thesis.     
 Since the 1970s, the number of films representing Islam was not significantly 
increasing. This was caused by left-leaning intellectual producers who gathered around a 
journal called Yeni Cinema (New Cinema). The filmmaker wanted to create authentic Turkish 
films by making realistic films about hard life in the Anatolian countryside and on the 
outskirts of the life of the Istanbul metropolis. Secular Republicans tried to reform Turkish 
language by replacing loan words and Arabic or Persian grammatical structures, as they are 
commonly used in Ottoman Turkish, with Turkish words, called öz Türkçe (pure Turkish) 
(Bruijn 2012). Islamic values were shown in many films about rural areas in Anatolia, though 
not explicitly aimed to spread Islam.       
 Under Yeni Sinema, criticism flowed towards commercial films with religious themes. 
The films are generally almost identical to each other, which makes conservative and 
nationalist intellectuals displeased with the quality of the film when religious elements were 
used for emotional abuse. Intellectuals believed Turkish traditions, culture and values must be 
transmitted through high-quality film language.     
 After the 1980 coup, Turkey experienced many changes both socially and 
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economically. In the film industry, many small companies were closed, gave way to new 
producers who are targeting the emerging video market. In the 1980s there was also a change 
in foreign capital regulations allowed foreign distributors to enter the Turkish market without 
intermediaries. In 1989, Warner Bros (WB) and United International Pictures (UIP) began 
distributing local and foreign films in Turkey. which hampered the development of the film 
industry in Turkey (Behlil 2010).       
 Efforts made by national cinema to make high-quality films to criticize poor-quality 
commercial films had stalled due to financial constraints affecting Turkish cinema and 
military coups experienced by Turkey almost every ten years. Every religion, apart from 
religious beliefs and practices determined by the government especially during the military 
coup, was evaluated as a 'reactionary movement that threatens national security', and people 
who live according to conservative Islamic rules were 'other people and foreigners' by the 
Republican elite. All these perceptions are reflected in films aired in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 In the 1990s, religious circles in Turkey wanted to spread the voice of Islam through 
modern mass media, such as newspapers, television, internet, and film (Bruijn 2012). One of 
the most successful films of this era was Yalnız Değilsiniz (You are Not Alone) (1990) by 
Mesut Uçakan. The film tells the story of a girl from a wealthy secular background, but she is 
a religious person. The film openly spreads the teachings on Islam. Until the end of the 1990s 
and the beginning of the 21st century, the Islamic factions, especially those advocating for a 
moderate form of Islam adapted to modernity, became very active in the media. At the same 
time, Turkish cinema rose again towards its heyday. Both developments produce Turkish 
films on Islamic themes, which have better quality and fewer missionaries (Bruijn 2012). 
 One theme rejected by the secular film commission and historical film is the depiction 
of Folk Islam, a combination of elements of Islam with animist beliefs and practices. Folk 
Islam practices occurred in Turkey include fortune telling, praying in the tombs of saints, 
magic, relic worship, talisman use, etc. (Özdemir and Frank 2000). According to the 
censorship commission, the practice blurred the line between religion and superstition. 
Therefore, the films shown are neutral and not influenced by a religion. The contradiction of 
film censorship in Turkey is a rejection to refer of religious reference in Turkish films. 
However, although the censorship commission tried to push Islam out of the public arena, the 
commission also sees itself as a 'true' guardian of Islam. The majority of rejected historical 
religious films were films that depicted historical and religious figures. Some of the films 
censored due to inappropriate religious elements are the film Anadolu'yu Türkleştirenler 
(Turkifiers of Anatolia) (1967), a film about Hacı Bektaş Veli, a 13th century Turkish Sufi, 
practitioner of the Hoca Ahmed Yesevi doctrine in Anatolia and eponym of Bektashism, 
Alevism religious order. The censorship commission identified the 'mistake' in the film as 
follows: performing azan after sunrise, talking when performing the azan, reading the Koran 
without saying 'Bismillah' (in the name of Allah), performing ablution while standing, and 
saying the syahada wrongly.  Another film censored because of the inaccuracy of the 
religious element was the film Allahın Arslanı Hz (Ali, Allah's Lion) (1969), a film about the 
Prophet's cousin and Ali's son-in-law, one of the most important figures in Alevi. The film 
was rejected by the Sensor Commission because there were many errors regarding the history 
and principles of Islam. The Commission argued the film misrepresented 'religion' and the 
figure of Ali. There was a significant change in the attitude of the religious censorship 
commission in the 1970s. The film Umut or Hope (1970) is one film rejected because of the 
depiction of religion contained in the film. The Commission considers the film to 
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discriminate against the rich with the poor, promote superstitious beliefs, mock religion and 
its functions. One scene that is considered to make fun of Islam is when Hoca performs 
morning prayer at sunrise. The Commission argued in Islamic belief, humans are not 
permitted to perform Subuh prayer when the sun has risen (Mutlu and Koçer 2012). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The cinema of Turkey considers as an expression of national identity. Cinema 
examines various movements, exchanges, and transformations as a staple of cultural 
production. After emphasizing modernization through the expansion of markets (the 
elimination of traditional obligations), the spread of protective ideologies and movements 
(the redefinition of families, the recognition of identities, and the creation of national and 
international institutions), and the regulation of the relations between people and their rulers 
(freedoms, human and civil rights, and popular sovereignty), it also notes that the spread of 
westernization in the form of entertainment media, which is film, is used to uphold the 
ideology of secularism initiated by Atatürk.       
 Censorship on films in Turkey is one way to maintain the secular ideology of the 
Turkish state. There has been a significant change in behavior towards religion in film. As 
seen in the case of the film Umut, film censorship is carried out not only to maintain secular 
ideology but also to protect the authenticity of religion by trying to redefine the place of 
religion in the modern Turkish society.       
 The analysis result shows secularism in Turkey is not just repressing religion, but also 
a struggle to limit and establish the role of religion in the country. Film is a medium used as a 
tool to present secular values and shows project Turkey as a country that wants to change to a 
modern direction.          
 The weakness of this study was the inability to watch films censored in the period of 
1939-1990. For this reason, further research is needed to deepen the analysis, for example 
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